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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Organizations and their actions have a large and continuing impact 
upon the world of men. Indeed, it is hard to visualize a world in which 
there would "be no organized human endeavor. Unfortunately, society's un­
derstanding of organizational behavior has yet to equal organizational 
import. Man has tried to understand this behavior, but his success has 
been limited and fragmented. However, an important turning point toward 
a more comprehensive understanding of organizational behavior has been 
reached in Organizations in Action by James D. Thompson. His work, based 
on the open-system school of organizational thought, perceives an organ-
1 
ization as survival-oriented and interdependent with its environment. 
Therefore, organizations are grounded in uncertainty and it is difficult 
to predict their reactions. Thompson's postulations develop this concept. 
He "enables us to conceive of the organization as an open system, indeter­
minate and faced with uncertainty, but subject to criteria of rationality 
2 
and hence needing certainty." If an organization is thought to be 
rational and to have a need for certainty, Thompson can offer propositions 
as to how and when an organization will act. The effect of Thompson's 
work is best summarized by S. H. Udy. "The effort meets with mixed 
-| 
This paper does not discuss the open-system vs. closed-system 
controversy. However, if the reader wishes to familiarize himself with 
this topic see Thompson's Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1967)1 PP» 4-7* 
^Ibid., p. 1 3 .  
1 
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success,... But such problems hardly mar the achievement of this book 
in synthesizing a variety of theoretical viewpoints and indicating a num­
ber of new directions to follow. It could be something of a landmark. "3 
Purpose and Scope 
It is the purpose of this paper to assess the validity and utility 
of several of Thompson's propositions by determining whether two very dif­
ferent organizations—the National Farmers* Organization and an Array Divi­
sion—can be described by them. The author does not have conqslete know­
ledge of the functions of all parts of these two organizations. Therefore, 
this study is limited to the author's personal observations of two specific 
organizational parts; namely, the Field Staff of the National Farmers* Or­
ganization and the G-1 Office of an Amy Division, The author has thorough 
knowledge of each through his" experiences as a G-1 Manpower and G-1 Readi­
ness Officer for a two-year period, during his three and one-half years in 
the U.S. Amy; and as Field Staff representative for the NFO during a three-
month sunmer Job, If these organizational segments uphold Thon5)son*s propo­
sitions, it is logical to spectilate that, in their entirety, both organiza­
tions will also support them. There will, no doubt, be differences in the de­
grees to which other parts of these two organizations uphold them because of 
variations in function, structure, and objectives. The value in assessing 
ThoiT5>son*s propositions—if they do represent reality—is to give the 
science of organizational management an la^sortant tool with which to un­
derstand, Interpret, and predict an organization*s actions easily and 
acc\irately. This paper seeks to establish the validity and utility of 
3s, H. Udy, "American Sociology Review," in Book Review Digest. 1968. 
ed. by Josephine Somudio (New York: The W. H. Wilson Company, 1969), p. 1320, 
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certain of Thompson's propositions in oirder to provide part of an assess­
ment of this tool for the analysis of organizational behavior. 
Because of the large number of propositions that Thonqjson has 
formulated, it is unrealistic to attenpt to analyse all of them con^jletely 
here. Therefore, I decided to analyze only the first five of Thompson's 
propositions. The ii^ortant point of this paper is not to determine how 
many propositions can be analyzed but to ascertain what information is 
derived from those that are explored. From this examination it should 
be possible to extrapolate the validity and utility of the remainder of 
Thoinpson's propositions. 
This paper is conqjosed of three parts. Part One includes the 
introduction and pvtrpose of the paper, and provides an outline of the or­
ganizations to be analyzed, in three chapters. Part Two is the main body 
of the papfr in which Thon5)son*s work is an analysis of the two above-
mentioned organizational sections. It is necessary to discuss Thon^son's 
first proposition for a conqjlete chapter in Part Two in order to clarify 
his con5)licated terminology and to set the stage for the ensuing proposi­
tions, Once this is acconqjlished, the remaining four propositions will 
be covered in a much more abbreviated manner within a single chapter. In 
effect, once one proposition is clearly understood, it then acts as the 
key to an understanding of the others. Part Three includes the conclu­
sions drawn from the analysis in Part Two and a selected bibliography. 
This discussion does not include specific recommendations for the two ana­
lyzed sections of the organizations; it rather involves a discussion of 
Thon^json's propositions on organizational theory and their inqilications 
for the two organizations. 
CHAPTER I 
THOMPSON; A BASIS FOR ANALYSIS 
Ra-fcionali-by 
A condition which Thompson places upon all of his propositions 
is found in the phrase, "Under norms of rationality."^ By listing the 
five propositions to be covered by this study, it is possible to clarify 
this all-important condition. These first five propositions are; (1.) 
Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to seal off their core 
technologies from environmental influences; (2.) Under norms of rationality, 
organizations seek to buffer environmental influences by surrounding their 
technical cores with input and output components; (3.) Under norms of ra­
tionality, organizations seek to smooth out input and output transactions; 
(4.) Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to anticipate and 
adapt to environmental changes which cannot be buffered or leveled; ( 5 . )  
When buffering, leveling, and forecasting do not protect their technical 
cores from environmental fluctuations, organizations under norms of ra-
tionality resort to rationing. A norm is a standard of some society. 
Thus, an organizational action can be judged on the criterion of ration­
ality only as its society views it. The society of which the organization 
^Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 19. 
^Ibid., Chapter 2, pp. 19-23. 
4 
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is a part judges its actions; it makes the distinction between the ac­
cepted and the unaccepted. Needless to say, various societies will not 
always rule identically upon the rationality of an organization's actions— 
what is rational in one society may be illogical in another, Thompson's 
propositions probably depict the actions of American organizations ac­
curately as that is his society. Were he attempting to describe the ac­
tions of organizations from a different society, the likelihood of his 
being in error would increase significantly. 
Now what exactly does this phrase "norms of rationality" mean in 
the context of his propositions? An organization operates within an en­
vironment which poses many uncertainties, but there is a need for certainty 
if an organization is going to achieve goals and suirvive. Therefore, an 
organization imposes standards of rationality on its actions to reduce 
this TMicertainty, The part of Thompson's propositions following the 
phrase, "Under norms of rationality," describes an action that an organi­
zation' will follow with the approval of its society while it strives logi­
cally to find certainty within its environment. There will be times, no 
doubt, when the imcertainty of the environment may overwhelm an organiza­
tion, ca\ising it to act in an illogical manner. Under such conditions, an 
organization may not follow Thompson's propositions. Most of the time, 
however, if uncertainties are not too great, an organization will seek 
certainty by following actions which correspond to its society's standards 
of rationality. 
6 
Value of Comparison 
Many of the works on organizational theory are based upon the 
study of one or several similar organizations. The resultant weakness is 
hest described by Amitai Etzioni. "Many case studies of organizations 
close with some universal statement about organizational variables 'based' 
on the study of one organization. Thus the lack of comparative models 
leads not only to overgeneralization but also to undergeneralization."^ 
This paper will attempt to avoid this weakness by analyzing two very dis­
similar organizations in order to discern the existence or non-existence 
of the common characteristics suggested by Thompson, The characteristics 
of these organizations differ decidedly in that one, the G-l Office of an 
Army Division, is hi^ly structured, fairly old, and assured of its con­
tinued existence; the other, the Field Staff of the National Farmers' Or­
ganization, is less structured, fairly young, and less certain of its own 
(or of the larger organization's) continued existence in a hostile environ­
ment. If both of these organizations react in the same way, in various 
situations, we can then draw some conclusions as to the nature of all or­
ganizational behavior, (it should be noted, however, that even if two 
organizations react in the same way, this does not conclusively prove— 
but does support—the proposition in question.) Caution should be used; 
even if a proposition has been upheld by the investigation of a number of 
organizations, there is no assurance that it will apply to another 
^Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations 
(New York; The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., A Division of the Crowell-
Collier Publishing Company, I96I), p. xiii. 
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organization. A real danger exists in that one might force an organiza­
tion to conform to a model| rather than huild a model to conform to an 
empirical reality. It is best to keep organizational theory general and 
flexible, using specifics from a single organization only as illustra­
tions of the theory. 
CHAPTER II 
EXPOSITION OP THE G-1 OFFICE 
The Chain of Command of a Division 
A division is the higgest coralDat unit of the Army. It is a com­
pletely independent organization and can function on its own for an in­
definite period of time. The strength of any army is measured by the 
combat ability of its divisions and their number. Thus, the division is 
the functional unit of the army. 
Figure X shows the formal chain of command of the U.S. Army down 
to the level of the division. This organization is primarily used in the 
United States and is not necessarily used in foreign zones of operation. 
The Commander of the United States Army is the President, who is 
a civilian, as are the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. 
Prom the Chief-of-Staff on down it is a completely military organization. 
The commander of a division is usually a major (two-star) general. 
The chain of command is a formalized part of the organization. 
All orders and information are expected to flow up and down the chain of 
command as shown inJ^lgureX. Any major deviation by any of the military 
commanders from this chain of command is punished by reprimand or removal. 
The mission of all levels of the U.S. Army is formally written, as is the 
chain of command; every member of the military organization knows his role 
8 
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FTSmE 1 
THE CHAIN OP COMMAND OP A DIVISION 
Division 
Chief-of-Staff 
U.S. Army 
Secretary of Defense 
and 
Secretary of the Army 
Commander-in-Chief: 
President of the United States 
III Corps: 
Corps Usually Control Two Divisions 
Poxirth Army: 
Covers a Geographical Part of the U.S 
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and his f•unction in the chain of command. Although there is usually an 
informal chain of command that springs up from time to time, it has no 
bearing on this discussion. 
The Structure of a Division 
Figure 2i shows the major parts of a division. The smaller units 
of the division, such as the corqjany and the platoon, are not included 
because they are not necessary to this analysis. 
The mission of the three Brigades is to confront the eneiny and 
defeat him through the use of close combat and fire control. They are 
made up of Armor (Tank) Battalions and Mechanized Infantry Battalions, 
The Brigades are so built that they serve as building blocks in which the 
Armor and Infantry Battalions can be combined to arrive at the correct 
proportion of the two combat arms at the objective. 
Division Artillery gives direct fire support to the three Brigades, 
Each of the three Brigades has an Artillery Battalion in direct support of 
its Battalions, One Artillery Battalion, with heavier guns, generally 
supports the whole Division, as does a Missile Battalion. 
Support Command gives direct logistical, medical, and transporta-
tional support to all of the Division. It also has an Administration 
Company in which are located most of the clerical workers in the Division. 
Division Troops consists of a group of units that also give direct 
support to all the elements within the Division. The Engineer Battalion 
primarily supports the three Brigades and Division Artillery in the accom­
plishment of their missions. The Signal Battalion and Military Police 
Company support Division Headquarters in maintaining contact with and 
11 
FIGURE 2' 
STRUCTURE OP A DIVISION 
Special 
Staff 
Division Command Section 
Commanding General 
and Aides 
Inspectoi Judge 
General Advocate 
General 
Staff 
Chief-of-Staff 
ig^ fo^ 
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3 Combat 
Battalions 
^1 — 
3 Combat 
Battalions 
3 Combat 
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ZZL 
Division Support Division 
Artillery Command Troops . 
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Battalions 
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Battalion 
Support 
Transport 
Battal i or 
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Battalion 
Medical 
Battalion 
Military 
Police Co. 
Adminis. 
Company 
Headquarters 
Company 
Data Process 
Detachment 
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order in higher and lower units. The Headquarters Company houses all of 
the personnel in the Divisional Staffs as well as the Commanding General 
himself. Its primary mission is to provide the necessities of life to 
the Headquarters and to provide transportation for it. The Data Processing 
Detachment is a new unit which provides mobile computer service to the 
Division; it is mostly used in the personnel and logistics fields. 
The Headquarters of the Division is fcomposed of two staffs. The 
first} the Special Staff, works directly for the Commanding General and 
reports directly to him. It consists of the Staff Judge Advocate, who 
is responsible for all matters dealing with military law throughout the 
Division; and the Inspector General, who reports all complaints and wrongs 
doings throughout the Division and also inspects for defects within the 
organization. The General Staff is responsible for four different areas 
of responsibility and is coordinated by and reports to the Chief-of-Staff, 
who, in turn, reports to the Commanding General. The G-1 is responsible 
for everything that has to do with personnel; the G-2 is responsible for 
intelligence gathering and use; the G-3 plans all operational missions 
and coordination throughout the Division; the G-4 is responsible for the 
logistics supply of the Division. All of the Special and General Staff 
have no authority over the line managers, but can only advise the Com­
manding General of the correct policies and procedures. 
Areas of the G--1 Office 
Now that the organization of the Division has been "the 
discussion of the G-1 Office will follow. E%ttire 3 shows its various 
areas. 
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FIGWE ̂  
AREAS OF THE G-1 OFFICE 
Special 
Staffs 
Finance 
Officer 
Adjutant 
General 
Division 
Surgeon 
Assistant 
G-1 
Division 
Chaplain 
Provost 
Marshall 
Headquarters 
Commandant 
G-1 Office 
"G-1 Officer" 
Assistant 
G-1 
Manpower 
Assistant 
Gr—1 
Safety 
Assistant 
G-1 
Readiness 
Headquarters 
Company 
Commander 
The mission of the G-1 Office is to provide advice and counsel 
to the Division Commander on all personnel actions which occur in the 
Division. It also provides service and help to the entire Division in 
all areas dealing with personnel except military law and complaints, which 
go to the Special Staff. The G-1 Officer, Adjutant General, Finance 
Officer, Division Chaplain, Surgeon, and Provost Marshall are all of the 
same rank, but their chain of command goes through the G-1 Officer. All 
of these men are regarded as Staff Officers. 
The following is a brief statement on the mission of each element 
under the G-1 Office. Each element has its own office. 
Adjutant General: Controls enlisted placements and keeps all personnel 
records within the Division. He heads a 450-man section. 
Finance Officer: Controls all payrolls and monies within the Division; 
heads a lOO-Hman section. 
Provost Marshall: Controls all police transactions within the Division; 
commands a 200-man section. 
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Division Chaplain; Advises the G-l of spiritual needs within the Divi­
sion; heads a 10-man section. 
Division Surgeon; Advises the G-1 of the medical needs within the Divi­
sion; is a medical doctor and heads a section. 
Headquarters Commandant; Responsible to the G-1 for the upkeep of the 
Divisional Headquarters; heads a 5-roan section and is a 
Captain. 
Headquarters Company Commander; Responsible for the operation of the 
Headquarters Company; is not in the formal chain of command, 
but is placed under the G-1 for supervision. 
The following individuals work under the G-1 Office. 
G-1 Officer; Is responsible to the Chief-of-Staff for the entire opera­
tion of the G-1 Office as well as subordinate offices. 
G-1; Coordinates and supervises the work of the G-1 Office. 
G-1 (Manpower); Determines the placing of all Officer and 
Warrant Officer replacements, keeps records on position and 
performance of all Officers and Warrant Officers in the Divi­
sion, keeps higher headquarters informed on the personnel 
needs of the Division and functions as an informal watchdog 
over the enlisted men's placements by the Adjutant General. 
This job also requires constant communication with all lower 
headquarters. 
G-1 (Readiness); Prepares reports to higher headquarters as 
to the personnel situation of the Division. This job also 
requires him to help the Manpower Officer determine personnel 
shortages throughout the Division. 
G-1 (Safety): Is responsible for ensuring that all Safety Rules 
and Regulations are observed in the Division, investigates ac­
cidents, heads a program designed to send a large amount of 
men to a local college and trade school to prepare them for a 
civilian occupation. 
These positions are all that of Junior Officers, except the G-1 Officer 
who is a Lieutenant Colonel, and the Assistant G-1 who is a Major. There 
also are six to ten enlisted men who assist these officers. 
Assistant 
Assistant 
Assistant 
Assistant 
CHAPTER III 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS* ORGANIZATION 
History 
The history of the National Farmers* Organization (hereinafter 
referred to as the NFO) has been short and stormy. As an organization, 
it was formed in 1958 in the raidwestem state of Iowa, and it has been 
only in the most recent years of its development that it has spread over 
the adjoining 4? states. The chief problem accounting for the NFO*s 
existence is the low commodity prices for farm products; low price levels 
having been the rule since the early 1950s, The NFO was founded origi­
nally to use political processes, largely lobbying, as a means of better­
ing farm prices; it changed its emphasis to collective bargaining with 
food processors, however, when it fo\md that politicians could not or 
would not help alleviate the farmers* basic problem of poor prices. In 
many instances, the problems of the more densely populated urban centers— 
with their large numbers of votes—interest the politicians far more than 
do the sparsely populated rural areas. Oi^ in those states >rtiere large 
urban areas have failed to develop are politicians interested in the far­
mers* political power. 
At various times since its inception, the NFO has called "holding 
actions" (strikes) against various food processing firms when collective 
bargaining has failed to bring about prices which the farmer judges as 
15 
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fair. A holding action is just what the name implies: farmers hold their 
production off the market in an effort to force food processors to come 
to terms. Unfortiinately, holding actions are often acconq^anied by NFO 
members' destroying their commodities to show their dissatisfaction. The 
shooting of swine, dumping of milk, and burning of potatoes have been and 
are much more interesting to the public and the mass media than are the 
agreements reached through peaceful collective bargaining between the NFO 
and the food processing industry. Therefore, the NPO has gained a reputa­
tion of being a somewhat radical, destructive organization. It must be 
pointed out, however, that the NFO is following the principle of collec­
tive bargaining adhered to hy labor unions and business concerns. The 
NFO is the tangible result of efforts by independent farmers to become 
organized in order to con5)ete in an increasingly organized world. 
The number of members in the NFO is a closely kept secret, as 
is usuiilly the case in most organizations which are starting out in a 
hostile environment. A "bluff is still en^jloyed when dealing with a food 
processor who does not know the number and strength of the NFO farmers who 
provide him with raw materials. It is known, however, that the NFO has 
become one of the largest farm organizations in America. At the NFO's 
last national convention it drew over 12,000 farmers from all parts of 
the country. 
Farming has long been viewed by the American public as one of the 
most peaceful and non-aggressive areas of American society. Many people 
still think of an agricultural career as a peaceful and contented life 
close to "mother nature," In other words, farming is thought to be an 
institution which has not acquired the "dog-eat-dog" characteristics of 
17 
the rest of American society. However, the increasing migration of 
farmers from rural areas to urban centers, and the increasing size of 
each farm (production unit), are not indicative of a very peaceful or 
content industry. 
Mission 
fhe theory of the HPO is fairly simple. It does not bxiy or own 
anything; it merely acts as intermediary between the farmer and his mar­
ket. It invokes a procedure used by labor, collective bargaining, to 
gain a better position for farmers in the American society. The farmer's 
right to use collective bargaining is guaranteed by the Capper-Volstead 
Act passed by Congress in 1922. If this process fails, then a holding 
action (strike) is called which forces the food processing industry to 
come back to the mediating table with a better offer in order to get the 
raw materials it needs to operate. The holding action is recognized as 
an extreme means to be used only after all other means are exhausted. 
Once an MPO contract has been agreed upon between the farmer and 
the food processing industry, it has been noted that the market prices 
rise over the agreed base price because other food processors not in the 
agreement feel they have to pay more to attract commodities away from the 
contracted food processor. Thus, the non-member farmer may initially 
benefit more from the agreement than does the NFO member who is contracted 
at a set price. The following year, however, the UFO farmer can arbitrate 
for the highest price offered by other food processors. As is the nature 
of arbitration under collective bargaining, neither side will get exactly 
what it wants; each will compromise for something in between the two 
18 
extremes. The important thing is that a hase price has been established 
(which never existed before in agriculture) from which both sides can work 
out agreements to their mutual benefit. 
Marketing is also an important part of the KFO program. Pri­
marily} this means getting commodities frcan the areas where a surplus 
exists to those areas where the commodity is in demand. Thus, a complete 
knowledge of the national and international markets must exist in the NFO. 
Structtire of the NFO 
Now that the history and the philosophy of the NFO have been 
outlined, the stnicture of the NFO can be explored. It is almost im­
possible to draw an organizational chart without showing the members as 
being both above and below the organization. The reason for this is that 
the members run the organization and, at the same time, are serviced by 
the organization. 
The NFO has not had the time, the capital, or the need to develop 
into as complete an organization as the Army. The commodity departments 
(grain, meat, and dairy) are still in an embryonic stage of development. 
Generally, a specialist must be added to the department for each commodity; 
for example, in the grain department one each is needed for wheat, barley, 
corn, and so on. The Field Staff has almost reached the zenith of its 
developnent because members are necessary first to make finances and com­
modities available to the Commodity Dei)artment. 
19 
FIGBRE 
SmUCTDEE OP THE KFO 
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The following is a brief statement of the functions of the various 
elements of the UFO. 
National Convention: Each year members elect delegates to represent them 
at the national convention. The primary duty of the conven­
tion is to set policy for the coming year and to elect a 
president and a board of directors. 
President; Is responsible for the entire operation of the NFO, appoints 
the Field Staff Supervisor, key Commodity Department personnel, 
and Marketing Area Chiefs. All of these individuals are 
salaried employees. 
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Board of Directors; Is responsible for overseeing the President and nnist 
approve all of his major actions. The number of Board members 
varies with membership. 
Commodity Department; Carries on collective bargaining and marketing 
activities for the NFO. Its responsibility is subdivided into 
three areas (grain, meat, and dairy) to deal with specific 
commodities. Each subdivision has a separate supervisor who 
works independently of the others. The present number of em­
ployees within the entire depajrtment is people. 
Marketing Area Chief; Acts as a communication link between the Commodity 
Department and the County Cell. At times he can also barter 
and market commodities within his own area. He has a small 
staff of 4 to 6 employees. 
Zones: For all practical purposes, this organizational level is only 
designated and rarely used for any purpose. 
County Cell; Is the basic unit of the HPO. It mirrors the National Head­
quarters in struct\ire except that all officers are elected 
farmers from within the county serving without pay and there 
is no Field Staff Department. The primary purposes of the 
county cells are to inventory all commodities for sale ujider 
the NFO, to elect delegates to the National Convention, to 
inform the national organization of grass-roots feelings on 
important NFO matters, and to encourage non-inembers to join 
the organization. 
Field Staff Supervisor; Is responsible for the recruitment of new NFO 
members, the collection of old dues, and the selection and 
training of Field Staff employees. He has a small staff of 
5 to 8 employees to help him maintain contact with the mar­
keting area supervisors. 
Marketing Area Field Staff Supervisor; Is responsible for recruitment 
and dues collection in an area about the size of a political 
state. One to ten, or sometimes more, organizers work under 
a supervisor, alone or in teams, depending upon the amount of 
territory to be covered and the attitude of the farmers in the 
area. 
NFO Organizer: Is the official "salesman" of the organization. He meets 
directly with the farmer to sell the organization, to provide 
incentives to old members, and at times, to collect bad debts 
such as late dues or handling costs. 
PART TWO 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EXAMINATION OP TH(MPSON*S FIRST 
PROPOSITION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Meaning 
The oi)en-system theory of organizational "behavior defines an or­
ganization as a grouping of interdependent parts which work together 
toward the goal of producing the goods and/or services upon which the 
whole siirvives. This definition is supported by Chris Argyris' statement| 
"An organization is characterized by an arrangement of parts that form a 
7 
unity or whole which feeds back to help maintain the parts." There arei 
however, certain of these organizational parts which are more significant 
than others. These parts comprise the organization's essence; they pro­
duce those goods and/or services which are necessary for goal-achievement. 
Without these parts, the organization could not exist. These essential 
parts of an organization can be referred to as the organization's core. 
The core defines the organization's function. The core element defines 
the organization's essence and goals; logically, it also provides the 
governing hierarchy that directs the organization toward its goals. An 
automobile company must produce cars, trucks, and spare partsj without 
7 'Chris Argyris, "Understanding Human Behavior in Organizations: 
One Viewpoint," in Modern Organization Theory, ed. by Mason Haire (New 
York; John Wiley &S01K, Inc., 1959)» P» 125. 
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these there would be no need for such other organizational parts as 
dealers, purchasing departments, or service departments. Therefore, 
the assembly line which manufactures cars, trucks, and spare parts is 
the core of an automobile company. Unless the core functions in the 
best possible way, the organization will not be maximally useful either 
to itself or to society, A simple example of the importance of this 
producing part is that during a strike of the assembly-line workers in 
which the supply of cars, trucks, and spare parts is cut off, the re­
maining parts of the automobile conqjany soon become unable to function 
properly. 
While the core of an organization is especially significant, the 
other necessary and sometimes vital parts of the organization (such as 
the above-mentioned dealers, purchasing departments, and service depart­
ments of an automobile con^jar^r) have functions which must also be defined. 
These parts have duties which deal with the inputs and/or outputs of the 
core. They either purchase the inputs (purchasing department) or sell the 
outputs (dealers) or maintain the inputs and outputs (service departments). 
It can be suggested, therefore, that these parts support the functions of 
the core; therefore, they function as the supporting parts of the organi­
zation. 
It is now possible to visiialize an organization as having two 
divisions, as is shown in the following diagram (Figiire 5). This diagram 
will clarify the separateness of these two organizational divisions. 
The differentiating characteristics of the core and support parts are 
that the core elements contain the organization's essence, because they: 
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(a) produce the organization's goods and/or services; 
(b) achieve the organization's goal(s); 
(c) ensure organizational survival; and 
(d) include the upper echelons of the organizational hier­
archy, the governing part of the core, which possesses 
the power to make and legitimize the policy that de­
fines the goals of the core elements. 
The support elements maintain the organization's essence because they: 
(a) provide the core's inputs; 
(b) circulate the core's outputs; and 
(c) service and balance the core's inputs and outputs. 
SUPPORT 
ELEMENTS 
CORE 
ELEMENTS 
UTPUT INPUTS 
Figure 5—Organizational Divisions 
As suggested above, an organization must direct its core toward 
some goal(s). Warren G, Bennis postulates that "Organizations are pri­
marily conqilex goal-seeking units."® Therefore, organizations structure 
®Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations. Alfred P, Sloan School 
of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (New York; McGraw-
Hill Book Conqxany, 1966), p, 7. 
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their cores toward goal-achievement, and as S. Avery Raube maintains, 
9 
"The objective determines the structure needed." The supporting parts 
of the organization will also be structured to help the core parts achieve 
the organization's goal. The automobile company structures its core 
(assembly line) to achieve its objective of producing cars, trucks, and 
spare parts. The supporting parts of the company also structure them­
selves so as to facilitate the passage and maintenance of inputs and 
outputs. 
In order to produce goods or services, an organization's core 
must also contain a working knowledge and strategy with respect to these 
important functions. In other words, the organization's core must use 
some form of an art or craft, which is technology. This knowledge and 
strategy make up an organization's core technology. Core technology refers 
to the basic knowledge and strategy used by an organization's core to 
produce the principal goods or services upon which the whole organization 
survives. A manufacturing company's core, for example, must use knowl­
edge relevant to the processing of raw material into finished goods. 
If there exists a core technology for the core elements of the 
organization, there also must exist a support technology to be used by 
its support elements to produce the support necessary for the core to 
function. The manufacturing company, for example, must use support tech­
nology to get the necessary raw materials to the core from the environment 
and to transport and sell the finished goods to the consumer. Also, there 
may be a need for additional support technologies within this same company; 
^S. Avery Raube, "Principles of Good Organization," in Readings 
in Management, ed. by Max D. Richards and William A. Nielander (2nd ed; 
New York: South-Western Publishing Company, 19^3)f P» 667. 
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for example, it may become advantageous for the company to open a cafe­
teria to improve employee relations. This cafeteria would not be directly 
related to the support technology maintaining the organizational core, 
however. It is, therefore, possible for the company to eliminate this 
cafeteria without appreciably harming the functions of its support ele­
ments or those of the company's core. Thus, scane support technologies 
will be more necessary and vital to the functioning of the organization 
than will others. 
An important factor which complicates the organization's attempts 
to use its elements and technologies to achieve its goal is its environ­
ment. For every organization there exists an environment specific to 
that particular organization. An organization's competitors, market, 
supply of raw materials, etc., all comprise its environment. Another 
example is that of the G-1 Office, which is located within a very unique 
environment—^that of the Army itself. As was shown in Figure 5, the en­
vironment is external to the organization; therefore, the organization 
has limited control over it. While the organization's external environ­
ment may have elements within it which range from hostile to friendly, 
the fact remains that without inputs from the environment the organiza­
tion could not exist, and without a place in the environment for its out­
puts there would be no need for the organization to exist. As Daniel 
Katz and Robert L. Kahn visualize it, "Open-system theory with its entropy 
assumption emphasizes the close relationship between a structure and its 
supporting environment, in that without continued inputs the structure 
would soon run down. On the other hand another major relationship 
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encompassed by a system is the processing of production inputs to yield 
some outcome to be utilized ty some outside group or system,"^® The 
entropy assun^jtion is that there must exist a quantity of energy that 
supports a system. For the above reasons, the environment is a tremen­
dously powerful force in the life of an organization whether it is friendly, 
hostile, or indifferent. 
Thus, the organization is confronted with an environment which 
it can only partially control. If the organization is to survive, it must 
interact with certain elements within its environment to ensure a supply 
of inputs ard a place for its outputs. Therefore, an organization and 
elements of its environment are always Interactingi th^ are interdepen­
dent, and have varying degrees of influence over one another. Influence 
is the power ei^er of an organization or of the elements of its environ­
ment to produce an effect upon the other. It is quite possible for the 
environment to refuse either to supply inputs, or to accept the outputs 
of an organization. Thus, the environment is affecting the life of the 
organization in a negative manner, due to the presence of negative en-
trtjjy. Thus, because the organization wishes to sturvive, it will do 
everjrthing possible to reduce the degree of negative influence that the 
environment has over it. The organization is caught in a dilemma; it 
must interact with the environment for its inputs and outputs, but it 
must keep the environment's negative influence at a minimum. 
^^Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Soc^l Psychology of Organi­
zations (New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 9. 
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If an organization wishes to survive, it must possess some means 
of defense against the negative aspects of the environment. Before an 
organization can defend itself competently, it must first control itself. 
A method by which it can both defend and control itself is sealing off 
its core technology. Sealing off prevents the loss of the knowledge and 
strategy of production (core technology) due to invasions by elements of 
the environment. Sealing off also ensures that an organization has maximum 
control over itself. While the organization interacts with the environ­
ment , it restricts its parts and individuals from certain actions which 
it believes are harmful to itself; therefore, the organization is internally 
protecting itself as well as increasing its control. 
An organization cannot absolutely seal off its core technology; 
there is no certain way to prevent knowledge and/or strategy from leaking 
out of the organization nor to prevent meddling with the organization by 
outside sources. Sealing off the core technology of an organization is 
a continuous process of control and defense by which the company tries to 
limit or minimize damaging influences on its core technology from outside 
of the organization. 
It is in the light of the above discussion that Thompson's first 
proposition can be advanced and explored. "Under norms of rationality, 
organizations seek to seal off their core technologies from environmental 
11 
influences." 
11 
Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 19. 
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Application to the Field Staff of the MFO 
In order to apply the first proposition to the Field Staff of the 
NFO| it is necessary to define the formal relationship of the Field Staff 
to the core technology of the MPO. As was noted in the definition of an 
organization, it must produce goods or services in order to survive. The 
NFO's goal is to produce higher commodity prices for member farmers 
through the process of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining fol­
lows these steps; 
(1) The farmer takes an inventory of the commodities he 
wishes to sell through the MFO; 
(2 )  He sends his inventory to the appropriate county meat, 
dairy, or grain chairman; 
(3) The different county chairmen total the commodities 
to be sold within their county; 
(4) The totals are sent to the Marketing Area Chief; 
(5) The Marketing Area Chief forwards them to the National 
Commodity Department of the HFO; 
(6) The National Commodity Department begins to barter with 
separate meat, dairy, and grain processors for the sale 
of these commodities; 
(7) An agreement is reached between the Commodity Department 
and the processor; 
(8) A contract is sent by the Commodity Department and the 
processor through the Marketing Area Chief to the 
separate counties; and 
(9) Each farmer member in a county decides whether or not 
he wishes to ratify the contract. 
If he does ratify the contract, arrangements are made to move his com­
modities. If he refuses to ratify the contract he may then sell as he 
pleases on the open market. The different county chairmen, the Marketing 
Area Chief, and the National Commodity Department work out the details 
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concerning the transportation of the comnrodities, the location of scales, 
etc. This process can be shortened by the Marketing Area Chiefs who may 
know of local processors and can negotiate with them. If an agreement is 
reached by the Marketing Area Chief, he must notify the National Commodity 
Department, Because the complete process of collective bargaining is 
carried on, or supervised by, the Commodity Department, its knowledge and 
strategy are the core technology of the NFO. It must be vinderstood that 
the policies formulated by the president and board of directors are also 
included within this core technology. 
The Commodity Department cannot, however, produce higher commodity 
prices tinless they have members who have agreed to give their support and 
to pool their commodities through the NPO. Without commodities there 
wovild be nothing for the Commodity Department to offer in exchange. Sup­
port in this instance is of a financial nature; the farmer contracts to pro­
vide either $75 a year for three years or one percent (IjJ) of the gross 
proceeds from any commodity which he sells through the NTO in exchange for 
the service (collective bargaining) of the Commodity Department. 
It is the f\mction of the Field Staff to recruit farmers who will 
furnish both support and commodities for the Commodity Department. Thus, 
the Field Staff which penetrates the agriculttiral community (environment) 
in order to recruit members performs an environmental function for the 
Commodity Department. 
In addition, the Field Staff maintains the core elements (Com­
modity Departments) of the NFO 1:^ visiting farmers who have not paid their 
dues or who have not moved commodities through the Commodity Department to 
indicate their dissatisfaction with the NFO's performance. It is the 
fimc-tion of the Field Staff to persuade these people to recommit them­
selves to the organization. This process is often almost impossible; 
non-complying processors often increase their market prices to attract 
HPO members away from the HPO's contracted price, and occasionally, the 
market price naturally goes above that negotiated by the KFO. The farmer, 
in these instances, can see no value in buying the Commodity Department's 
services. 
In order to function, the Field Staff must also have a technology 
which alloxijs it to recruit members and collect dues for the core. This 
technology will be called a support technology, because it supports the 
core. 
It must also be pointed out that while a Field Staff employee is 
recruiting farmers or collecting old dues, he is also providing certain 
services to the farm community which are not directly related to Field 
Staff functions. He carries news concerning crop reports, births, deaths, 
and weddings to all i)arts of his territory. He may become a community 
leader. The Field Staff employee's biggest contribution in this area, 
however, is the least visible, because he provides human contact and con­
versation to a generally lonesome rural population. 
The Field Staff formally functions as a supplier of inputs (mem­
bers) to the Commodity Department, and it also acts to maintain the supply. 
One becomes increasingly aware of the importance of these functions as 
the condition of the organization is explored informally, because the Com­
modity Department has not yet even developed into a self-supporting part 
of the organization. A large majority of American farmers refuse to trust 
the marketing ability of the Commodity Department. As a result, the one 
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percent (I5S) mark-off charged farmers ty the Commodity Department for 
its service has not generated enough revenue to cover its cost of opera­
tion. 
This situation is primarily the result of three factors; 
(1) Not enough farmers joined the NFO at its inception 
to offer a great amoTint of support or commodities to 
the Commodity Department; 
(2 )  It takes a great deal of time, once support and com­
modities are available, to build up an organization 
capable of dealing with all commodities on a nation­
wide scale (one or more market experts usually must 
be added to the Commodity Department for each commodity 
such as peas, wheat, hay, feed cattle, etc.); and 
(3 )  Food processors can ignore the agreements offered by 
the SoBimodity Department because it has few commodities 
to offer, and has had very little farmer support. 
The Commodity Department could not threaten to cut off the flow of com­
modities to an uncooperative processor. Thus, a unique situation exists 
within the NFO; its core elements are not f\illy functioning and are not 
providing enough services for the organization to survive. The Field 
Staff has overcome this difficTilty by providing enough funds through mem­
bership drives and the collection of old dues to enable the organization 
to s\irvive. 
It could, therefore, be logically argued that the NPO's core is 
not achieving its goal of better farm prices. The NFO has had to shift 
its goal priorities from increased farm commodity prices through collec­
tive bargaining to dues collection in order to survive. As such, the 
knowledge and strategy used by the Field Staff has become more important 
to the organization than dcQlect±v»%B'^adii4ng. Needless to say, this 
situation will not long be tolerated a member, A farmer joins the 
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NFO for the services of the Commodity Department (higher commodity 
prices through collective bargaining) not for endless membership and 
dues collection drives by the Field Staff, Thus, the long-term sur­
vival of the NFO depends upon the Commodity Department's using its 
core technology to gain better farm prices. 
The NFO*s actual goal at present is the establishment of the 
Commodity Department as its functioning core element. Until that goal 
is reached, the NFO will not be a very effective organization. It can, 
however, keep the environment from destroying it by generating support 
through the Field Staff, As such, its support technology has become 
more important at the present time than its core technology. 
In order to apply the rest of Thompson's first proposition, it 
* 
is necessary to examine how the Field Staff seeks to seal off the NFO's 
goal-oriented core technology (contained in the Commodity Department) and 
its support technology from environmental elements. There are basically 
three different methods used to protect these technologies. The first 
method is simply the recruitment by the Field Staff of as many farmers as 
possible into the NFO, The advantage of this method is that an increase 
of support and commodities from a larger membership allows the Commodity 
Department to develop into a functioning core element; members give it 
both the power needed to deal with uncooperative processors and the 
revenues gained from commodity transactions needed to support NFO growth. 
If the Commodity Department becomes increasingly successful in negotiating 
for higher fam prices, the Field Staff will be able to portray this 
success for non-member farmers. Because nothing sells better than success. 
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recruitment will then become easier for the Field Staff. In both the 
core element and its supportive body, increased membership means increased 
organizational power to deal with its environment. Power, in turn, can 
ty used by the NFO to defend against loss or escape of its core technology 
to harmful elements, or its being undermined by them. A processor will 
have to agree to collective bargaining with the Commodity Department when 
he knows his supply of commodities will be almost totally cut off. He 
will no longer be able to hinder the fiinctioning of the core technology 
of the NFO. The processor was meddling with the NFO's core technology by 
not letting it operate upon his inputs (commodities); he also meddled in 
the Field Staff's support technology by not giving any positive assurance 
to farmers in his area that joining the NFO co\ild result in higher prices. 
Thus, he was indirectly blocking Field Staff membership drives. Once a 
contract is successfully negotiated with the processor ty the Commodity 
Department, his roadblock to increasing membership for the NFO is de­
stroyed. This first method of sealing off organizational technologies 
is the most iii5)ortant; unless the NFO can acquire enough inputs to become 
powerful, it >/ill not be able successfully function within its environment. 
The two remaining methods of sealing off organizational techno­
logies are related because they both deal with the Field Staff's efforts 
to defend its own knowledge and strategy from environmental elements. 
In order to understand these methods, however, it is necessary to examine 
the educational process by which an employee becomes a functioning Field 
Staff member. 
There are two means of acquiring the knowledge and strategy of the 
NFO's support technology. First, there is the use of a classified pam­
phlet outlinir^ the procedures to use in recruiting farmers and collect­
ing old dues; second, there is a week-long class held by Field Staff 
Instructors for all new en^jloyees, covering basically the same material 
as is contained in the pamphlet, with class practice to inqjrove the field 
performance of the en^loyee. Both the panqjhlet and the class cover the 
trade secrets of the support technology by outlining correct methods to 
make the farmer more receptive to the Field Staff employee's ideas. Some 
selling techniques covered by both modes of instruction are: the correct 
opening address by the employee to put the farmer at ease and capture his 
attention, the proper words to use to impress and captivate the farmer, 
the degree of dress needed to ensure the enqiloyee's respectability (both 
suits and levis are unsuitable), and the proper closing statement by the 
employee ("You want to join the NFO, don't you?"). In both the class and 
the pamphlet instructions, the employee is required to memorize a routine 
that incorporates all of these tactics. The class method goes beyond 
the paraphlet by requiring class practice of the routine, and it includes 
more complete instruction on the farmers* problems and the NFO's ideas 
for rectifying them. Also, because a new enqjloyee has a chance to see 
the national headquarters in action, he will have a more detailed idea 
of the ftinctioning parts of the NPO. Because of the advantages of the 
class method, all new en^aloyees are now required to attend it. While a 
week may seem a short amount of time, it is fairly exhaustive and can 
tvirn a city-born employee into a knowledgeable member of the rural-oriented 
Field Staff. 
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Now it is possible to examine the relationship between this educa­
tional process and the remaining two secondary methods of sealing off 
organissational technologies practiced by the Field Staff. A second seal­
ing off method is the previously mentioned classification of the Field 
Staff's instructional pamphlet. Classification keeps the knowledge and 
strategy of the supporting technology restricted to the individuals who 
must have knowledge of it in order to function within the organization. 
The reasons for the Field Staff's efforts to classify or restrict its 
knowledge and strategy are to prevent the loss or escape of its core 
technology to other farm organizations, and to keep farmers from knowing 
the methods used to recruit them. Naturally, the Field Staff does not 
want successful methods lost to con^etition; a great deal of time and 
money has been invested into their development, and the Field Staff feels 
that its technology is superior to that of others. Therefore, it impels 
its employees, under threat of job loss, to hold this information, unique 
to the organization, secret. Farmers are a very suspicious lot; if they 
knew the many subtle methods used by the Field Staff to recruit them, 
they would probably resent the Field Staff recruiters and resist the NFO. 
A third method used by the Field Staff to seal off its technology 
involves using its members* expertise. A member's expertise is the result 
of the training class and his experience in recruiting farmers. Working 
in the field with the farmer allows the Field Staff member to discuss the 
entire spectrum of farm problems. Thus, his knowledge grows until he can 
discuss farm problems on an equal footing with arQrone. Expertise of the 
Field Staff member permits him to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 
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of the support technology by using his acquired knowledge to develop new 
or better methods of recruitment and collection. Thus, he is also ef­
ficiently contributing to the first method of sealing off, that of in­
creasing UFO membership. 
Also a knowledgeable member can better seal off the support tech­
nology because he can identify harmful elements within the environment, 
and can devise defenses against them. Another organization or a powerful 
individual may wish to prevent the Field Staff from recruiting members in 
an area because the NFO will bring in unwanted corqaetition. These organi­
zations or individuals are very subtle, and an inexperienced or ignorant 
Field Staff member may not know of their opposition. An experienced and 
knowledgeable Field Staff member, however, will recognize the extent of 
the organizational or individual opposition, and he can develop a scheme 
of action to expose the true reasons for the opposition of these groups. 
This process of defense may become a battle between the Field Staff mem­
ber and his opposition, but, usually, the Field Staff will be able to 
continue recruitment of farmers or collection of dues in an area. Thus, 
the expertise of the Field Staff member enables the knowledge and methods 
of the support technology to function despite opposition. 
It must also be pointed out that harmful environmental elements 
may not wish to oppose or to attack an organization when it is known that 
experts hold important positions within the defending organization, Who 
wants to oppose an organization that has superior knowledge, especially 
when it can only be attacked on its own ground? Therefore, expertise 
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within an organization's membership can become an important defense in 
itself, because it reduces attacks and opposition from harmful environ­
mental elements. 
The Field Staff does not need to defend itself or the NFO as 
forcefully from environmental elements which may have beneficial or neutral 
influences. While on the road, a Field Staff member often trades informa­
tion with other traveling salesmen who also work extensively with rural 
populations. During such encounters, knowledge and strategy which are 
necessary to the Field Staff's support technology are often exchanged 
with outside elements for portions of their technology. The process is 
mutTially beneficial. Items that are often exchanged include: correct 
modes of dress, political remarks to avoid, road conditions, financial 
conditions of a certain area, and social and ethnic differences. All of 
these items are important if the Field Staff member is to expand the tech­
nology he utilizes in the field. As a result of such informal meetings, a 
Field Staff member can better utilize his support technology to expedite 
the recruitment or collection processes. All parties to such informal 
meetings can be somewhat assured that information traded will be kept 
within the informal salesman group, because all parties fear leakage of 
their methods and knowledge to farmers. Farmers' awareness of such infor­
mation could easily result in their alienation. 
Also, local political or commiinity leaders who support the NFO are 
often invited a Field Staff member to participate in the recruitment of 
members. These individuals are given a certain part of the sales routine 
usually covered by the Field Staff member. They are especially valtiable 
in reducing the farmer's uneasiness toward the Field Staff employee who 
is often a stranger. In any case, after several days of working with the 
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staff employee, the leader will be better acquainted with the current 
support technology. In both cases, however, a Field Staff member shares 
only enough of his technology to ensure that he will get the information 
or cooperation that he wants from others. Outside individuals are not 
given access to many of the details which the Field Staff member feels 
should be known only within the organization. The reason for this action 
is that the Field Staff employee cannot really trust outside individuals' 
loyalty. 
Application to the G-1 Office of an Army Division 
Applying Thompson's first proposition to a division's G-1 Office 
necessitates the definition of the functions of an Army and its divisions 
in order to specify the core technology of these organizations. The main 
functions of an Army are to provide defense for the people, property, or 
interests of a national state or its allies against hostile elements of 
another national state(s) and to provide aid to civilian populations in 
areas damaged by a natural disaster. Therefore, an Army produces defense 
or help for elements of its environment. In return for these services by 
the Arpy, the national state furnishes support in the form of manpower 
and funds upon which the Army is dependent for its survival as an organ­
ization. 
The entire Army, however, is a very large and bulky organization 
which necessitates its separation into various functional elements. As 
previously stated, the division is the main functional element within the 
Army which can produce defense or aid. A division usually can defend 
people, territory, or interests with the use of its combat units 
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(Armor, Infantry, and Artillery) or can supply aid to civilians in a 
nattiral disaster hy relying upon its large inventory of manpower and 
equipment. There are various small units, such as Task Forces and Bri­
gades, which can also undertake the functions of the Army, but they lack 
the division's strength in manpower and equipment and are not commonplace, 
HighBr level units such as Corps, Armies, and Army Groups function pri­
marily to command, coordinate!^ maintain, and supply the divisions under 
them. These units rarely engage in the acttial provision of defense or 
aid to elements of their environment. 
Therefore, elements withinithe division must employ the core 
technology of the Array, because their knowledge and strategy will pro­
duce the products of the Amy—defense or aid. Figure will be helpful 
in visualizing the various elements as they are differentiated. The three 
Brigades and the Division Artillery with their immediate hierarchy (the 
Division Commander and his immediate aides) are the core elements of the 
division. Support Command and Division Troops are direct support elements, 
but can function as core elements in extreme emergencies. If any one of 
these specialized elements is not ftinctioning properly, the entire divi­
sion in turn cannot function as desired. The Signal Unit provides communi­
cation throughout the core elements; without its support the command would 
lose control over all of the elements, thereliqr jeopardizing the entire 
division. If the supply and transportation element does not provide the 
combat elements with such necessary materials as food, gas, or clothing, 
the combat elements would not be able to defend or give aid. Thus, the 
division's core elements and the direct support elements are highly inter­
dependent with one another, as will be explained later in more detail. 
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The G-1 Office is instrumental in the formation and interpreta­
tion of personnel policies and procedures by which the Command Section 
regulates personnel matters within the division. Now that the position 
of the G-1 Office has been reviewed, its functions can be explored. One 
of the Gr-1 Office's main formal support functions is to provide personnel-
related services and advice to the core and direct support elements of 
the division, especially the Division Command Section. It is part of 
the General Staff, which as the name implies is the Commanding General's 
staff. The G-1 maintains a roster of all officers and warrant officers 
within the division and can move individuals from one Brigade to another 
to maintain equality in numbers as well as in rank, in accordance with 
the policy set by the Command Section. The G-1 Office also advises and 
services all other core elements of the division on personnel policy and 
actions. The commander of a Brigade may have an officer who must be 
transferred out of the Brigade to avoid conflict within that unit. The 
G-1 Office, with the approval of Division Command, will effect this 
transfer. Also, a Brigade or Battalion Commander may contact the G-1 
Office to have policies or procedures clarified. 
A second function of the G-1 Office is to command and coordinate 
its special staffs (seeK.jgure '3 ). The specialized offices of the Ad­
jutant General, Finance Officer, Provost Marshall, Division Chaplain, 
Division Surgeon, and Headquarters Commandant were created to deal with 
the many facets of personnel. All of these specialists are controlled by 
the G-1 Office, and they report in their respective fields through the 
G-1 Office to the Division Command Section. They also help the G-1 Office 
with advising and servicing the Command Section and the other core elements. 
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and they aid in forming and interpreting policy and procedures within 
their respective fields. For example, the Command Section in response 
to the report of increased traffic accidents from the Provost Marshall 
via the G-1 Office, may order the initiation of a drivers' education 
class, the particulars of which will be arranged by the Provost Marshall's 
Office subject to the approval of the Command Section. The G-1 Office is 
the communication link in this whole process and serves similarly with 
its other special staffs. It may become necessary for the G-1 Special 
Staff to report on pressing problems directly to the Division Commander. 
The G-1 Officer will still accoitpany the special staff officer to meet 
with the commander, and in some cases add his comments as to the nature 
of the problem, 
A third and most in^jortant function of the G-1 Office is the ac­
quisition of replacements (irqjuts) to fill vacancies within the division. 
Without manpower, the division would not be able to produce defense or 
aid for the state. The G-1 Office and the Adjutant General's Office share 
the responsibility of acquiring replacements by notifying, through per­
iodic reports. Army personnel agencies of the personnel needs of the divi­
sion, The G-1 Office reports officer and warrant officer needs, and the 
Adjutant General reports enlisted man needs. In addition, the G-1 Office 
helps to maintain the replacements (inputs) once they arrive within the 
division by providing services through its special staffs for the in^jrove-
ment of a replacement's general welfare. There are various specialized 
areas in which a replacement may need help that are coordinated by the 
G-1 Office, For spiritual needs, the replacement can turn to the Division 
Chaplain; for medical aid, the Division Surgeon; for police, the Provost 
Marshall; for financial aid, the Finance Office; and matters of personnel| 
the G-l Office or the Adjutant General's Office. The special office of 
Headquarters Commandant does not provide any service to a replacement, 
"but it does support the Division Command Section and its headquarter staffs 
by ensuring that desks, chairs, and lights are provided and are in clean, 
working order. 
The core and direct support elements of the division are sup­
ported by the G-1 Office and its special staffs; these staff offices do 
not directly produce defense or aid} thus, they do not use the knowledge 
and strategy of the core technology. Instead, the G-1 Office must possess 
a correct understanding of the core technology used by the core elements 
if it is to service and advise them. Individuals within the G-1 Office 
must understand military terminology, symbols, and maps or they will 
neither be able to follow the movements or maneuvers of the core elements 
nor to communicate with them. For this reason, officers trained in the 
function of the combat units are the ones assigned to the G-1 Office. 
While all of the G-1 functions are necessary to the core elements 
of the division, just how vital they are is open to question. If the 
functions of the G-1 Office were for some reason discontinued, the core 
elements would surely find some way to carry on. However, the division 
would have to decentralize its personnel operations. Decentralization 
would necessitate duplication of effort in each core element, and thus, 
would raise the cost of administration throughout the division. Also, 
the Division Command Section would lose some control over the personnel 
f\mctions of the core elements, because decentralization would allow 
lower tinit commanders (at Brigade or Battalion levels) to implement per­
sonnel policy and procedures. 
Additional evidence that an Array can operate without the detailed 
advice and services provided by the G-1 Office and its special staffs is 
found in foreign armies. They often operate with a very small personnel 
office and entrust the bulk of these functions to either higher or lower 
units} in very new or primitive armies, there may be no personnel depart­
ment whatsoever. 
The G-1 Office and its special staffs may not be vital to the 
core elements, but they do act as an important instrument by which the 
core technology possessed by the core elements is sealed off from environ­
mental influences. In order to perceive how the G-1 organization accom­
plishes this process, it is necessary to visualize it as a peripheral 
organization acting between the core elements and the environment. If a 
higher •authority, such as a Corps Commander, questions the Division Com­
mander's actions in a matter related to personnel, the G-1 Office helps 
defend the Division Commander. The Corps Commander may feel that too 
many Armor Officers are being assigned to a certain division, or he may 
suspect that a division is deliberately reporting shortages of a certain 
critical specialty. The G-1 Office could defend the Commander in the 
first instance by providing a roster, by grade and position, of all the 
Armor Officers within the division. From such exact information, a de­
fense can be formulated by the G-1 Office and passed on to the Division 
Commander giving such reasons as that most of the Armor Officers with the 
division are directly engaged in the functioning of core elements (Armor 
Units) and their loss out of the division would have an adverse effect 
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upon its ability to perform, or that a large number of Armor Officers 
were found to be second lieutenants and as such are not as vital to the 
fiinctioning of a core element as is an experienced officer of a higher 
rank. In the first case, the Division Commander can argue with the Corps 
Commander that a loss of Armor Officers will result in dysfunction within 
his core elements; or in the second case, he can allow a certain number 
of armor lieutenants to be taken from the Division with the knowledge that 
their loss will not cause dysfunction. Thus, a Division Commander with 
the knowledge given him ty the G-1 Office can better control his internal 
affairs as well as defend his core elements from encroachment, thereby 
sealing off his core technology. 
A second means of sealing off the core technology offered to the 
core elements the G-1 Office and its special staffs is its large number 
of specialists and experts. These individuals represent such diverse 
professions as physician (Division Surgeon), policeman (Provost Marshall), 
personnel expert (Adjutant General), clergyman (Division Chaplain), and 
payroll expert (Finance Officer). If an environmental force tries to in­
fluence the core elements of the division in any of these fields, the en­
vironmental force in most cases will be required to have an expert of its 
own in each field. A hostile iiKiividual who wishes to poison the food or 
water of a core element would have to find some way of getting arovind the 
inspection procedures established by the Division Surgeon. Thus, the 
professional Division Surgeon and each aspert can individually help to 
seal off the core technology of the division. 
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While the G-1 Office exerts efforts to seal off the core tech­
nology, it also exerts a fair amount of effort to seal off its own support 
technology and has, thereby, increased its power beyond that authorised 
formally. There are three attributes of the structure of a division 
which have allowed this extension of power. The discussion of these at­
tributes will show that Thompson's first proposition may be applied to 
explain the strategy of support technology as well as core technology. 
Originally, the G-1 Office and its special staffs had very few functions 
to perfonn for the core elements and were small and powerless entities. 
The core elements carried on many of the various personnel-related fvinc-
tions of the staff offices. As the core elements' environment became 
increasingly complex, a need developed for specialized personnel services. 
Staff offices were created to provide these specialized services for the 
core elements. As a result, the core elements became increasingly de­
pendent upon the staff offices for personnel-related advice and service. 
The important staff service of providing and maintaining inputs (manpower) 
to the core elements has especially developed core dependence upon the 
staffs. Without a stable supply of manpower the core elements could not 
function to provide defense or aid. Thus, the first attribute is the 
increased complexity of the division which has developed due to the en­
larged mission, increased record keeping requirements, scientific ad­
vancements, and increased size of the core elements all of which work 
together to necessitate a specialized personnel service. 
The dependence of the core allows the staff elements to exert a 
degree of influence over the core elements. The more influence the staff 
positions have upon the core elements, the more entrenched they become 
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within the division. Shutting down the G-1 Office and its special staffs 
would require the afore-mentioned decentralization. Because core elements 
do not wish to expend time and manpower upon such an undertaking, the 
staffs will probably continue in their present tasks; their survival is 
assured. 
Another characteristic of a division that staff offices can use 
to their advantage is the small size of the divisional Command Section. 
It is impossible for the Division Commander or his few aides to oversee 
all of the personnel functions carried on by the G-1 Staffs within the 
division. Thus, the staff offices have some freedom of action outside 
the scrutiny of the Command Section. This somewhat autonomous sit\iation 
allows the staffs to operate beyond the boundaries imposed upon them by 
the Command Section. It is possible, because they control replacements 
for the G-1 Office and the Adjutant General's Office, to take the best 
officer and enlisted replacements for their own use. Such a process may 
dej^y the core elements the raw material necessary to them if they are to 
function properly. The Command Section may never discover this corrup­
tion unless they physically interview the Office's personnel or look at 
its records. Because such acts are time-consuming, these offices can be 
fairly sure that their corrupt acts will not be discovered. 
The G-1 Office can, iii effect, seal off its technology from the rest 
of the organization. By putting its own interests above those of the core 
elements, it seeks self-perpetuation. The G-1 Office is often fvil]y staf­
fed or overstaffed when core elements are unable to function properly be­
cause of personnel shortages. This sittiation is allowed by the Command 
Section and the other core elements because without the proper ftinctioning 
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of the G-1 Office the important input of mainover will not be forthcoming. 
The Coimnander of the G-1 Office can, however, use this situation to en­
large the amount of advice and service the office provides to the core 
elements. Thus, he is increasing both the importance of his office and 
the dependency that the core elements have upon the G-1 Office. 
A final peculiarity is the staff's position within the division. 
The G-1 Office and its special staffs are close to and part of the center 
of power, authority, and control possessed by the Division Command Sec­
tion. While a staff cannot give a command to a core element (only the 
command element has this iaiportant power) the staffs do act as a communica­
tion link between the core elements and the core command, as previously 
described. As such, a staff often speaks for the Commander to the core 
elements. It is, in fact, interpreting the Commander's orders for the 
core elements. A problem is encountered here, because the staff inter­
pretation provided for the Commander to the core elements can easily be 
interpreted by them to be exactly as he wishes. Thus, policies and proce­
dures initiated ly a staff position without formal recognition from the 
Division Commander are often taken by the other core elements as direct 
orders from the Commander. In such cases, the staff is exceeding the 
formal power given to it and is exercising a powerful influence over the 
rest of the division. Thus, staff positions can sometimes be discovered 
acting despotically when they command other elements. 
The G-1 Office often requires the core elements to follow its 
directions on personnel-related matters, without the approval of the 
Command Section, If the core elements do not question the legitimacy of 
these directions, the G-1 Office can actually speak as the Commander in 
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its field of personnel. Most core elements recognize the informal posi­
tion of power and authority of the General's Staff including the G-1 Of­
fice. Officers of a core element are often extremely nervous when a G-1 
Officer visits their \init, because a General Staff Officer can easily 
forwaird a damaging report about the core element directly to the Commander, 
Thus,:a staff officer represents the eyes and ears of the Division Com­
mander. 
To stimmarize, then, due to these three factors—the increased 
complexity of the environment, the smallness of the Command Section, and 
the proximity of the staff to the Command Section—the G-1 Office and 
its special staffS* functions within the division impel increasing de­
pendence of the core elements upon the support elements. In fact, the 
support agencies can become almost as powerful and important as the core 
elements. This power enables them to seal off their support technology 
from the environment and from their own organization. The powerful posi­
tion and the specialization of the G-1 Office and its special staffs fur­
nish them the necessary influence to subvert the goals of the core. For 
example, the goal of the division could be shifted from that of producing 
defense and aid (which utilizes the core technology) to that of adminis­
tration, thus replacing the core technology with the support technology. 
If this switch occurred, it is even possible to state that these staff 
offices operate as if they comprise the core rather than support elements. 
The G-1 Office and its special staffs have knowledge and strategy 
which is tinique to them. Even the Division Command Section has trouble 
understanding and penetrating these specialized areas. The Division 
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Commander has fairly limited knowledge in the specialized areas of the 
medical or spiritual needs of the division. Thus, he is hesitant to 
question any acts of these offices and thereby show his ignorance. In 
this way, this specialization affords a second means by which the G-1 and 
its special staffs seal off their environment, and also seal in their 
knowledge. The G-1 Office often has trouble managing its special staffs, 
because it has no specialists. Instead, its personnel are from the Combat 
Arm Branches. The G-1 Office overcomes this difficulty by training its 
own personnel to become specialists. For example, the G-1 Readiness and 
Manpower Officers are usually kept in their position(s) for a period of 
two years so that they may become proficient enough to act as watchdogs 
over the operation of the Adjutant General. Thus, specialists are created 
to watch over specialists. 
Comparison 
Both the Field Staff of the NFO and the G-1 Office of an Army 
Division perform the function of seeking to seal off their respective 
core technologies from outside influence. While the modus operandi for 
these organizational parts is very different, the end result is the same. 
Therefore, these two very different organizations appear to support 
Thompson's first proposition. For clarity it has been necessary to de­
lineate the differences between an organization's core and support ele­
ments and their respective technologies. The core provides the organiza­
tion's essence, while the support elements function as input and output 
components and seal off the core elements' technology from environmental 
influences. In this way, these supporting elements have also become 
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defense and control components. In their expanded roles, these support 
elements have achieved very important positions within their respective 
organizations. The functioning of the Field Staff is more important to 
the NPO's short-run survival than is its core. It is, therefore, critical 
for the Field Staff to seek to seal off its own support technology from 
the environment. A critical problem in the life of the MFO v/ill be when 
to switch the organization's reliance from the short-term survival of the 
Field Staff to the long-term survival offered by the Commodity Department, 
its core. The G-1 Office can act as though it had a core function instead 
of a support function. It can act outside of the authority allowed to it 
by the core, and can actually seal off its technology from its own core 
organization. An important problem in the life of a division is how to 
prevent this support element from abusing its power. If the NFO cannot 
switch from support to core reliance for survival, and if the division 
cannot control the functions of its support element, then the danger 
exists that their cores will not be able to function properly, threaten­
ing both goal achievement and siirvival. 
In the light of the discussion of the support elements, Thompson's 
first proposition may be restated to read, "Under norms of rationality, 
an organization's core and support ccmiponents will seak to seal off all 
technologies (both the core and the support technologies which the organ­
ization perceives as necessary to its short- or long-term survival) from 
environmental influences." Occasionally, there is the possibility that 
the support elements will be too efficient in sealing off either their 
own or the core's technology. The Field Staff can oversell the EPO by 
recruiting more farmers than the Commodity Department can handle; the 
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G-1 Office can overstaff itself by using more personnel and power than 
is necessary for its proper functioning. In both cases, this causes the 
core to assume a secondary position within the organization. 
While it is easy to enlarge upon Thompson's first proposition, 
it is hard to disagree with the philosophy contained within it. Basically, 
an organization must survive within its environment. The degree to which 
the organization feels the need to survive varies with its degree of 
establishment. The relatively new HPO is somewhat unsure of its survival, 
v;hereas the established Army division is almost guaranteed of its sur­
vival. Both organizations are stniggling within the environment to main­
tain their self-control and to construct suitable defenses to seal off 
their core technologies from influence. Because the environment will 
always attempt to undo the organizations' efforts to seal off these tech­
nologies, the organizations can only seek a perfect state. This method 
is a very primitive form of control and defense. The organization can 
only seek to ensure its life; it cannot have an absolute guarantee upon 
its life. It must interact with the environment and accept the risks and 
chances involved in survival. 
CHAPTER V 
A CONCISE DISCUSSION OF FOUR ADDITIONAL 
PROPOSITIONS OF THOMPSON 
Buffering 
Since an organization cannot seal off its technical core completely 
while maintaining its interaction with the environment for a supply of 
inputs and a place for outputs, it must devise more complex methods of 
controlling and defending itself against the environment. The place to 
carry on such methods is the boundary between the environment and the or­
ganization. In other words, the supporting elements (the input and output 
components) become the focus for organizational control and defense against 
the environment. One of the biggest problems for the support elements is 
defending against a fluctuating environment which causes the organization 
to have a varying supply of inputs or outputs because of changes in the 
environmental supply and demand. If an organization is to survive, it 
must have some stability in its supply of inputs and demand for outputs. 
Otherwise, its core will be either overextended or underworked. In order 
to increase its chances of survival, the organization can try to control 
these environmental variations of its core's inputs and outputs by using 
its support elements as a buffer, A means of buffering used by the input 
or output components of a manufactxiring company is the stockpiling of raw 
materials or manufactured goods. In this way, the core's inventory will 
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be steady in the face of fluctuations ins^nvironmental supply or demand. 
As Thompson suggests in his second proposition, "Under norms of ration­
ality, organizations seek to buffer environmental influences by surround-
12 
ing their technical cores with input and output components." As with 
sealing off, an organization can only seek to buffer itself, because there 
exists no sure way of guaranteeing that input and output components can 
regulate environmental supply and demand. 
The input component of the MFO is the Field Staff, whose purpose 
is to provide farmer members for the dore and to maintain them once they 
have joined the organization. There is no real output con^jonent within 
the NFO, because the core itself (Commodity Department) produces higher 
farm prices through collective bargaining. There is no way 6f stockpiling 
these higher prices. Commodity agreements with processors are good only 
for a short period of time and cannot be stored away for another day. 
Because the Field Staff has few useful methods available to imple­
ment it, buffering is carried on only in a limited fashion. The Field 
Staff will send some employees into an area with the purpose of vis­
iting members whose dues are to be paid in the next couple of months. 
The employees are, in effect, performing preventive maintenance 
on the organization's membership. He is trying to make siure that members, 
inputs, do not drop out of the organization. Thus, he is trying to ensure a 
steady flow of support and commodities from the member to the core; he is buffer' 
ing the technical core. Also, this preventive maintenance by the Field Staff 
^^Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 20. 
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enables it to forewarn the core of a drop in membership if it learns of 
dissatisfaction. It must be pointed out that unless the core performs 
its function of raising farm prices, the Field Staff probably will not 
be able to maintain the membership. Farmer'members want results and not 
just a friendly visit from the Field Staff. 
An additional method of btiffering used by the NFO is the exten­
sive training of its Field Staff employees in an effort to increase their 
efficiency and effectiveness. Also, Field Staff employees are titilized 
ty their supervisors so as to allow them to develop their greatest poten­
tial. Both the training and the supervising of employees buffers the 
core by allowing them the maximtrm knowledge necessary to deal with the 
fluctuating environment. One employee iaay have the persuasive talent 
needed to talk dispirited members back into the NFO; another may be most 
productive when sent into areas in which new membership drives are needed 
or in which membership maintenance is necessary to maintain the core's 
inputs. 
The success of buffering by the Field Staff depends on the ef­
fectiveness of the support technology which is used in training Field 
Staff employees and the ability of the Field Staff employee to utilize 
the support technology given him. Possible deficiencies of the support 
technology include its incomplete development in so yoting an organization 
and its inappropriateness for a given farmer or commxinity. Even after ex­
tensive training and supervising an employee may not be able (or may re­
fuse) to utilize the support technology provided him ty the Field Staff or 
he may simply not work, and ifimb»b^ond organizational control. An organi­
zational effort to btiffer the core which relies upon this type of individtial 
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will fail. To fulfill the organization's wish to buffer its core, it must 
depend upon the efficiency of its support technology and upon the Indi-
•fidual Field Staff employee's ability to use his acquired knowledge to 
deal with his environment and to take ot'ders from his superiors. Buffer­
ing by the Field Staff to protect the core is dependent upon the refining 
of its support technology and the recruiting of employees who fulfill the 
twin abilities mentioned above. Even with 100/J effective technology and 
en^^loyees (if this were possible), extreme environmental fluctxiations such 
as have occurred in agriculttire over the years (19'l'O's boom, 1960's bust) 
would probably acttially determine whether the buffering acts of the Field 
Staff are successftil in protecting the core from environmental influences. 
The G-1 Office is an input component of the division. It pro­
vides replacements to the core, and advises and services the core. The 
core's environment, especially that of the Command Section, is such that 
personnel-related inputs such as reports, awards, etc., come into it in 
such great quantity that they all cannot be dealt with immediately. The 
variety of these items is also a factor because they include medical re­
ports from the Division Surgeon, religious and morale reports from the 
Chaplain, police reports from the Provost Marshall, and personnel-strength 
levils, congressional correspondence, etc., from the Adjutant General's 
Office. In addition, some of these reports are verbal reports issued by 
one of the G-l's special staffs to the Division Command Section to keep 
it updated on certain critical items, e.g., the fatal result of a traffic 
accident involving personnel from the division. Buffering is handled by 
the G-1 Office in these cases by using a system of priorities to handle 
the material in a systematic way and prevent the Division Command Section 
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from being overwhelmed with paper work. Thus, the G-1 Office functions 
as a buffering agent for its technical core. 
The assignment of priorities to reports is in most cases an in­
formal process which is carried on try a few select members of the office. 
The criteria used to establish this priority system are: the importance 
of the report, the rank of the person submitting the report, the date that 
the report is due to a higher authority for action, and the personal feel­
ings of the person making the priority judgment toward the originating 
person(s) or unit(s). The G-1 Officers most responsible for judgments 
on priorities are the Major (Assistant G-1) and the G-1. Under this 
system some items, those judged not to be of great importance, are allowed 
either to die a slow death by inaction, or are acted upon when nothing 
else is pressing. Highly important items are expedited; normal priorities 
are acted upon as soon as possible. 
The advantage of such a system is that it allows the G-1 Office 
to control the inputs into the core. Because this priority system re­
duces inefficiency and confusion within the core, it also keeps outside 
authorities, such as higher headquarters, from meddling in the core ty 
showing them efficiency and purpose. Thus, it also defends the core. 
It also acts as a screen that shuts off items that are unimportant to 
the core Command Section and prevents its becoming inundated by small 
details. A danger of this system is that the G-1 Office may abuse its 
position by filtering out bad reports and submitting only good reports to 
the Command Section. Thus, it can make itself or its special staffs look 
good in the eyes of the Commander, when such a state of affairs is any­
thing but the truth. Also, a G-1 Officer may stop a report that looks 
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insignificant only to learn with the passing of time that it was judged 
significant by the higher command. Another problem is encountered if the 
person submitting the report doesn't agree with G-1 priorities. Usually, 
such disagreements are handled in one of two ways. If the person sub­
mitting the report outranks the G-1, the problem is forwarded to the Chief-
of-Staff for a solution, A person of the same or lesser rank than the G-1 
would have to negotiate with the G-1. If he is under the G-l's control, 
he would have to accept the G-l*s decision as a final answer. If he does 
not subnit to the G-l*s decision, he can be removed from his position, or 
he can take the drastic step of skipping the G-1 in the chain of command 
and request a decision from the Chief-of-Staff, Such actions are taboo to 
everyone in the Arnor and, therefore, usually result in additional problems 
for the individual. 
The G-1 Office also buffers the core by inspecting core elements 
to make sure that they are following all personnel-related policies set 
by Corps and higher headquarters. It is thus ensuring preventive main­
tenance upon the core elements to prevent their being found deficient ty 
the environment. The G-1 Office can also abuse its power ty arbitrarily 
requiring certain items or procedures of the core elements during inspec­
tion without the approval of the Command Section, Thus, it is able to 
increase its own power at the expense of the core. 
) 
Vftiile the G-1 Office can buffer the core by using the above means, 
it has found it impossible to buffer the flow of replacements into the 
division. Decisions upon the flow of personnel into a certain division 
are set at Army levels and as such are completely out of the range of the 
G-l's control. Because the G-1, as an input component, cannot control 
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this important environmental input, the division's core can have problems, 
at times, providing defense or aid. This situation underlines the im­
portance of input components buffering the technical core from environ­
mental influences. 
In understanding Thompson's second proposition, one must realize 
that while buffering may prevent some environmental fluctuations from 
overcoming an organization, it may at the same time present problems as 
has been shown in the case of the G-1 Office. Buffering was unjustifiably 
used there to cut off a flow of negative information to higher authorities 
and to increase the pov/er and position of the Office. The buffering tech­
nique of preventive maintenance used by the Field Staff, if misused or 
overused, could alienate farmers rather than encourage them to continue 
their membership in the UFO. 
Another way that buffering may cause problems to the organization 
is in the use of methods of buffering which have become obsolete or in­
adequate due to the passing of time or changes in the organization. The 
inputs and outputs of an organization may change drastically, requiring 
a new means of buffering them. The stage of development and the objec­
tives of an organizational component also seem to have a regulatory ef­
fect upon the use of buffering. The G-1 Office can already make extensive 
use of buffering to deal with its enviroimient and increase its power 
while the Field Staff is still somewhat limited in this respect. The G-l 
Office is well-developed and has the formal objective of helping the core 
along with the veiled objective of helping itself. On the other hand, the 
Field Staff is young and primarily interested in facilitating the func­
tioning of the organization's core. Therefore, it has little interest in 
the use of buffering to extend its own power. 
It can also be suggested that the state of the environment itself 
sometimes has an important influence on both the degree of use of buffer­
ing and the methods used by an organization. In a combat situation, the 
G-1 Office would certainly be faced with problems similar to those of the 
Field Staff. Efforts to buffer the core in this more fluid environment 
would force it to spend more time buffering to protect the core and less 
time to enhance its own position. !Ehe greatly increased volume of work 
that would be handled by the G-1 Office would allow it no time for self-
interested buffering until it had perfected its technology to deal with 
the new environment. Another illustration of the effect a changing en-
viroment has on buffering is that of the Field Staff. In its early 
stages of development, Field Staff employees were hired and given no 
training and very little supervision. Thus, the organization's use of 
buffering through an educational process was extremely limited, and the 
employee was on his own within the environment. As the Field Staff s 
and the HFO's environment became increasingly complex, training and super­
vision were added to buffer the organization against the environment by 
increasing its internal control and external defense. 
Leveling 
The two previously mentioned methods of organizational defense 
and control (sealing off and buffering) have been primarily centered upon 
internal organizational actions to deal with the environment. Now it is 
time to explore another defense and control method in which the organiza­
tion actually reaches into the environment to reduce the fluctuations 
which affect its input and output transactions. This method, called 
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leveling, results in a smoothing out of input and output transactions in 
which the organization induces the environment to react in a "beneficial, 
predictable manner. It defends against environmental fluctuations by re­
tarding their development, and it thereby controls the flow of inputs 
and outputs to and from the core. An example of leveling is a manufac­
turing company's offering a cash inducement to its customers to buy its 
products during a period of low seasonal demand. While there is no as­
surance that the environment will react in a manner which is beneficial 
to the organization, leveling is an effort by the organization to progress 
within the environmental context. As Thompson maintained in his third 
proposition, "Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to smooth 
13 
out input and output transactions." 
The KFO is currently moxinting a nationwide recruiting campaign 
by the Field Staff, with the help of grass-roots membership, to induce 
non-member farmers to join the organization. Using member farmers to 
help the Field Staff usually results in more successful recruiting drives. 
The result of this campaign could be the establishment of the maximum 
number of members that the organization could expect to recruit at a 
certain point in time. In other words, the MPO's membership will be 
stabilized at the point when enough farm commodities are flowing through 
the MFC to ensure that the food processors will recognize its power and 
offer a fair price for commodities, without overwhelming the Commodity 
Department. Two more factors establishing this optimum number of members 
are the minimum necessary to provide financial support for the NPO, and 
1 Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 21. 
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an upper limit placed so that the Field Staff will have time to recruit 
new members to replace those lost through attrition as well as to main­
tain the current members. If the replacement of lost members biy new ones 
is not adequate, the NFO may offer a special inducement to potential mem­
bers so that its optimm level can be maintained. This special induce­
ment would be a leveling effort on the part of the organization. 
In areas which once had a large active membership, but have be­
come inactive, the MFO makes a different type of leveling effort. The 
Field Staff sends a large force of employees to entice ex-members back 
into the organization by means of an intense person-to-person communica­
tion of the NFO's successes and the values of rejoining. One inducement 
to rejoin the organization is often simply to get all of these Field Staff 
enqjloyees off his back. Once the ex-member is back in the fold, inputs 
will presumably restune flowing into the core. Such leveling methods are 
not very successful, because ma^y ex-members become more resentful with 
each visit until they refuse even to consider rejoining the NPO, 
The Field Staff, not the entire NFO, is the organizational ele­
ment in these leveling actions which actively seeks to smooth out input 
transactions. Therefore, it may be possible to enlarge upon Thon5)son's 
third proposition in that he maintains that organizations seek to smooth 
out input transactions, but this examination revealed that a support ele­
ment, the Field Staff, did the actual smoothing out of the NFO's input 
transactions. The NFO*s hierarchy, a colre element, ordered the Field 
Staff to try to smooth out the flow of inputs. Thus, the organization's 
core elements may order their support elements to smooth out the flow 
of inputs or outputs; the support elements do the acttial work. On the 
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basis of this information, Thompson's third proposition would be restated, 
"Under norms of rationality, organizational input and output components, 
upon orders of the core, seek to smooth.out input and output transactions." 
The G-1 Office smooths out the inputs to the division command ele­
ment by setting required dates for delivery of reports from lower units in 
order to make certain that sufficient time is allowed for evaluation by the 
G-1 Office before the reports are forwarded to higher headquarters. A 
major report would usually require at least two days of evaluation and 
correction before being forwarded to higher headquarters, III Corps. The 
exact date on which a report is to be delivered to the G-1 Office is set 
by the G-1 after conferring with the Chief-of-Staff. The advantage of 
this arrangement is that the office of the Chief-of-Staff, a core element, 
provides additional leverage to ensure that tinits comply with the due 
date. No unit commander wishes to be reprimanded by the Division Command 
Section for delinquent reports. Once again the proximity of the G-1 Of­
fice to the center of power can allow it to exercise the power of a line 
position; it can actually issue orders to core units. 
The G-1 Office also tries to protect the core from the inconven­
iences they might encounter consequent to the smoothing out procedures 
initiated by a higher organization's input component, such as G-1 of III 
Corps. Foremost of these problems is meeting the dates that reports are 
required to be submitted to higher headquarters. The G-1 Office protects 
the core in these instances by requesting the Corps to allow more time, 
or by ignoring hi^er headquarters' request for a report until the last 
possible moment, or by engaging in informal arguments between subordinate 
officers of the higher III Corps and the lower division G-1 Offices. 
VJhile arguing in itself solves nothing, it does stall for time. The 
danger in this course of action is the possibility of the argument:: 
reaching the superiors of the two officers which allows a minor argument 
to become a major conflict in which the losing office would usually be 
the lower division G—1 Office. Prom this case, it can be observed that 
input components often come into conflict when they try to smooth out the 
various transactions between them. 
One input to the Division's Core which the G-1 Office cannot 
smooth out is the inflow of replacements, which is its most important 
input into the division. This input is out of the range of the G-1's 
control and as such is a critical variable in the core's ability to oper­
ate. 
The G-1 Office and the Field Staff both have the same functions 
because they act as input components attempting to smooth out input trans­
actions. Thus, they provide empirical support for Thompson's third proi)-
osition. The UPO and the Army Division look upon the Field Staff and the 
G-1 Office, respectively, as instnaments by which they attempt to influence 
the environment by their efforts to smooth out inputs. Because the G-1 
Office has command-related control over that part of the environment with­
in the division, it can be reasonably sure that it can smooth out these 
inputs into the core command section by setting due dates upon reports. 
Therefore, the more influence the component has over its environment the 
more likely it is to succeed in smoothing out transactions. However, the 
G-1 Office's and the Field Staff's attempts to smooth out input transac­
tions over which they have little influence or control has no guarantee of 
success. The environment may not wish to cooperate with the organization's 
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components. Without some degree of cooperation from the environment, all 
attempts to smooth out input or output transactions will fail. 
Anticipation and Adaptation 
If an organization cannot seal off its core technology, buffer 
its core from the environment, or change or smooth out environmental fluc­
tuations, it must then seek other methods of control and defense against 
the environment. One method, which is primarily defensive, is to try to 
look into the future and predict environmental fluctuations or changes. 
An organization's core may be performing a function that the environment 
no longer needs. The U.S. Government may pass a bill authorizing the 
creation of a government agency which will perform the functions of the 
NFO. If the KFO has not anticipated such a government move, it will be 
caught by surprise and will probably be destroyed. Needless to say, 
anticipating changes within the environment which may range from completely 
irrational to mostly rational is a very difficult task. However, if an 
organization can anticipate environmental change, it can initiate search 
for a way of adapting in order to stirvive. The NFO might have foreseen the 
above change in government policy and changed objectives from collective 
bargaining to politics, which would mean an attempt to influence the func­
tioning of the new government bargaining agency through political acts such 
as lobbying. While anticipation is a prime defensive mechanism of an organ­
ization, adaptation also permits an organization to defend itself by chang­
ing its objectives and/or techniques. It is in the light of the above dis­
cussion that Thompson's fourth proposition can be examined. "Under hbrms 
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of rationality, organizations seek to anticipate and adapt to environ­
mental changes which cannot be buffered or leveled, 
Because the Field Staff penetrates the environment for the core 
(Commodity Department) of the NFO, it is relied upon as a source of in­
formation that can be used to anticipate future environmental changes. It 
may be discovered by the Field Staff, for instance, that large blocks of 
members are disgruntled because they have not seen any action on the part 
of the Commodity Department to raise the price of their commodities. The 
Field Staff can pass the names and location of these members on to the 
Commodity Department with the hope that they will be contacted by the core 
and told of contract agreements within their areas. If no action is taken 
ly the Commodity Department, the Field Staff can predict that these mem­
bers will drop out of the organization. Both the Field Staff and the Com­
modity Department have the information necessary to adapt to the loss of 
these members* financial support and commodities. The problems of this 
information-sharing procedure is that often there is a breakdown of com­
munication between the support and core elements of the NFO, Either the 
Commodity Department doesn't get the correct information from the Field 
Staff as to the nrimber of dissatisfied farmers, or the message is not com­
municated with the sense of urgency necessary to promote action. This 
problem is largely the result of human inattentiveness. 
While the Field Staff does pass on information concerning member­
ship to the dore, which is its primary responsibility, it does not pro­
vide very much information regarding commodity market trends. No de­
tailed market analysis is provided by the Field Staff or ai^y other support 
I'^'Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 21, 
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element. The Commodity Department will probably find it advantageous to 
establish support elements whose specific function will be to provide it 
with detailed market analyses. There are already individuals within the 
Commodity Department who are increasingly taking over this role. 
The Field Staff also compiles information that is necessary to 
its support role within the NFO, Detailed maps are kept which allow the 
success or failure of membership drives. Computerized membership rosters 
are maintained to facilitate dues collection. Daily communication between 
Field Staff employees and their supervisors is official policy. With 
such information, the supervisor can anticipate future trouble spots and 
can suggest methods to deal with them. A supervisor may learn from one 
of his field employees that an area already organized under the !JFO con­
tains large numbers of non-member farmers who are willing to enter the 
NFO. He can, then, switch other employees into this area and quickly pro­
vide more inputs to the core, 
A point that must be stressed from the Field Staff's example is 
that without an adequate flow of information into the organization there 
cannot be anticipation of environmental change. Needless to say, without 
anticipation there cannot be adaptation. Because anticipation is so im­
portant, specialized support elements are often given the function of 
information analysis in order to anticipate future trends. 
While the G-1 Office cannot buffer or smooth out the inflow of 
replacements, it can try to anticipate futtire manpower levels. Thus, it 
is trying to forecast future environmental changes. Forecasting of future 
personnel input flow is accon^jlished by the G-1 Office and the Adjutant 
General requesting from tiigher headquarters a detailed summary of officer. 
warrant officer, and enlisted replacements that the division can expect 
over a given period of time. Also, individual orders from Army level 
iirhich assign replacements to the division are carefully screened "by these 
two offices to deteraiine rank, skills, and date of arrival. With such 
information, the G-1 Office and Adjutant General Office forecasts are 
nearly correct; the division's core vjill know and can adapt to shortages 
or excesses of personnel. !Hie core can also judge from this information 
its ability to produce defense or aid. If core units are understrength, 
they will not be able to fujiction properly in their assigned roles. 
Because anticipation of future manpower levels is so important to 
the core, the G-1 Office and Adjutant General spend a great deal of time 
and manpower in order to forecast future manpower levels accurately. The 
environment, however, is often in such a state of fluctuation because of 
political or social changes that all efforts to anticipate and adapt to 
manpower changes are frustrated. The division may be brought up to full 
strength more rapidly than usual to meet a woria crisis, thus straining 
the abilities of the G-1 and Adjutant General's offices to anticipate and 
adapt to the new situation in a logical and systematic way. The divi­
sion's core will also have difficulty reactixig to the new inputs, which 
may temporarily decrease its efficiency. 
^A fundamental distinction between the Field Staff and the G-1 
Office is that the Field Staff is primarily interested in anticipating 
and adapting itself to change and has a secondary interest in providing 
the KFO's core with information necessary to this anticipation and adapta­
tion. The G-1 Office, on the other hand, has the primary function of 
providing information upon futxxre environmental changes to the core. 
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There are fevr, if any, reasons for it to anticipate and adapt itself to 
environmental change because its own environment is stable enough for it 
to learn what adaptive changes are necessary. The G-1 Office knows what 
to do with new conditions; it doesn't have to anticipate them. If, how­
ever, the division is moved into a combat situation, the chances are that 
the environment will change enough so that the G-1 Office must anticipate 
and adapt for its own survival. Therefore, the condition of the environ­
ment is an important determinant of the degree to which an organization 
or its parts try to anticipate and adapt to environmental change. It is 
also important to note that organizations use their support or peripheral 
elements as information gatherers to gather the knowledge necessary to 
anticipate environmental changes and adapt the core and support elements 
to them. To summarize this discussion: Thompson's fourth proposition 
is valid, but the important questions of exactly how an organization anti­
cipates and adapts to environmental changes and to what extent this anti­
cipation and adaptation are necessary must be answered separately for 
each organization. 
Rationing 
It is not always possible to use the preceding methods to control 
the organization so as to protect it from the fluctuations, changes, and 
power of the environment. The Field Staff may not be able to collect dues 
or recruit new members because of adverse conditions such as poor crops, 
discouraging economic circumstances (inflation or recession), rural pov­
erty, detrimental press, or Tinsettling political remarks. In all of these 
cases, the inputs upon which the NFO is dependent can be seriously 
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disrupted. As has been stated before, the flow of military replacements 
into the division may not be adequate because of Annjr commitments to other 
zones of operation or because of political factors. No amount of pressure 
upon higher authorities can or will increase the flow of personnel avail­
able to the G-1 Office. Therefore, the division's core is faced with the 
prospect of becoming understrength and unable to function. In both in­
stances, the support cou^jonents of these organizations, the Field Staff 
and the G-1 Office, are unable to change conditions that are threatening 
them as well as their cores. 
The administrator and commander of these two organizations cannot 
ignore these disruptions of their organizations* functions. Therefore, 
the President of the NFO and the Commander of the Division will have to 
initiate some method or action to insure the survival of the entire or­
ganization. This method of dealing with such situations is best described 
by Tho?^son*s fifth proposition. "When btiffering, leveling, and forecast­
ing do not protect their technical cores from environmental fluctuations, 
organizations under norms of rationality resort to rationing,"^5 Ration­
ing is an action used try an organization in which it apportions a smaller 
than usual amount of supplies under a priority system to maintain the 
survival of its core. 
The method of rationing practiced by the G-1 Office is to assign 
what replacements the division does receive from the Ariqy to priority 
units, e,g., the maintenance battalion, in order to keep the core's equip­
ment functioning. The divisional commander tells the G-1 Office which 
^•5ThoD5)son, Organizations in Action, p. 23. 
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units have priority vjithin the division. Units which do not receive 
priority designations are usually administrative support elements, he-
cause the commander feels the core can somehow function without them. 
Financial difficulty in the HPO that is brought on hy inadequate 
member support is handled by simply not issuing paychecks to employees 
until the organization becomes financially solvent. The decision to under­
take such a drastic measure is made by the higher authorities of the UFO, 
usually the President. Because both the core and support elements are 
equally important to the HPO's survival presently, the entire organiza­
tion undergoes financial rationing. Despite this organization-xiride ra­
tioning, there are probably certain key individuals who continue to 
receive funds. Most employees seem to accept this arrangement until they, 
too, become financially insolvent, at which point many quit. Despite 
financial distress, the sense of performing a vital mission for American 
agriculture keeps most employees working long after employees of other 
organizations would resign. 
Five important aspects of rationing are apparent in both organ­
izations. First, the leader of the entire organization imposes rationing 
upon some or all of the core and support elements. Elements x-jhich are 
most restricted are those judged to be least necessary to the survival of 
the organization. They are usually support elements, but can also include 
core elements; for instance, one or two maneuver battalions may be insuf­
ficiently manned to keep the others up to strength. Second, rationing 
is an extreme means of controlling the organization. In effect the or­
ganization's leadership is trying to prevent energy from leaving the or­
ganization unnecessarily, but to limit necessary supplies means that the 
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organization cannot ftinction up to its capacity. Third, rationing can 
work hest in an organization such as the HPO where employees feel they 
are accomplishing something constructive in spite of inadequate supplies. 
Fourth, rationing is only a temporary solution to an organization's prob­
lems. An employee of the Field Staff working for an extended period of 
time without a paycheck and having a family to support cannot give his 
full attention to finding ways to recruit additional members or collect 
dues. He will soon "be xirorrying more about his own survival than that of 
the organization. A division that cannot provide defense or aid to its 
society because of extensive personnel shortages is useless to the Army. 
Thus, it would either have to be disbanded or brought up to strength. If 
the cores of these tv/o organizations do not fimction at their maximum 
over a period of time, by producing hi^er farm prices or by providing 
defense and aid, their environments will have no need for them and they 
v/ill cease to exist. Fifth, rationing is to be umdertaken only after all 
other methods—^buffering, leveling, and forecasting—^have failed to con­
trol and defend the organization from the environment. Buffering, for 
example, is a logical method of the organization to deal with its environ­
ment. Rationing, on the other hand, is a last-ditch effort applied v/ith-
out much logic simply to save the organization. Using such drastic steps 
is very costly in economic, political, and social terms. Cutting off 
employees* paychecks or leaving units unable to function brings into 
question the ability of these organizations to function within their 
environments. 
The above five points seem to substantiate Thompson's fifth prop­
osition. Rationing is a last effort when all else has failed to ensure 
the survival of the organization vjithin the environment. 
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There are tvfo ways that these organizations can try to overcome 
the environmental fluctuations v/hich necessitated rationing. They may 
simply wait until time rectifies the environmental irritants, e.g., the 
end of a recession for the HPO, or a change of Army priorities which will 
give the division adequate personnel. If time will not rectify the situa­
tion, these organizations must reprogram their cores to supply items 
needed "by the changed environment. The KPO can once again become a small 
organization serving only those areas which will support it; the division, 
with Army approval, may iDecome a smaller task force which can perform 
with feHer personnel. An organization must restructure itself to operate 
effectively and efficiently within its environment. 
PMT THEEE 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Validity and Utility 
This study has established support for the validity of five of 
Thompson's propositions (as outlined in Organizations in Action) when ap­
plied to the two widely differing organizations discussed here. As has 
been shown, they can be enlarged upon and restated, but it is impossible 
to find fault with Thompson's basic premises. It is conceivable that the 
remainder of Thompson's propositions are equally valid, though it has not 
been possible to discuss them in this paper. 
The utility of these propositions is established ty the fact that, 
once understood, they can be combined with empirical knowledge to analyze 
why, when and how an organization reacts to its environment. Their ul­
timate value lies in their ability to make thesscience of organizational 
management easier to \inderstand and to use, A part of this science in­
cludes the foretelling of the need for future actions on the part of 
various organizations. For example, if the NFO accomplishes its goal of 
raising farm prices, it must recognize that some other segment of society 
will have lost a proportionate amount of revenue. It must anticipate the 
resultant hostility and adapt itself the means advanced l^y Thompson, 
e.g., strengthening its sealing off procedvires to prevent the hostile 
elements from interfering in the fiinctioning of its core and support 
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technologies, and establishing an agency among its support elements which 
would buffer the entire organization by maintaining a positive public re­
lations program. For example, this would include explaining how the rise 
in prices benefits farmers and society as a whole. 
Point of Departure 
Thoit^json describes two very different types of mechanisms in the 
five propositions discussed in this paper. Sealing off and rationing are 
both extreme, almost instinctive mechanisms to restrict negative entropy; 
buffering, leveling, and anticipation and adaptation are methods used 
when an organization is faii-ly sure of its stability. These two cate­
gories are differentiated by the certainty or uncertainty with which the 
organization views its environment in specific instances. Since the G-1 
Office is fairly sure of its existence, it can utilize buffering, level­
ing, and anticipation and adaptation to a much greater degree than can 
the NFO. There are circumstances, however, when it has little control, 
such as in its allotment of replacements, and must, therefore, use sealing 
off and rationing. No organization has enough power to control its en­
vironment completely and totally eliminate uncertainty. 
It was noted in this analysis of Thompson's propositions that the 
support elements of both organizations utilized the mechanisms described 
in acting for or upon the core elements. Therefore, the support elements 
act to shield the core from the environment and thus reduce uncertainty. 
We have probably followed the line of thought envisioned by Thompson when 
he stated, "As a point of departure, we suggest that organizations cope 
with uncertainty by creating certain parts specifically to deal with it. 
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specializing other parts in operating under conditions of certainty or 
near certainty,As envisioned by this author, the support elements 
deal with the uncertainties of the environment so that thelcore elements 
can work in relative certainty. The importance of the support element 
is emphasized by the negative exan^le of the two organizations. Neither 
has an output support element since there are almost no ways of rationing, 
leveling, buffering, or anticipating contracted farm prices or the need 
for defense or aid. Therefore, their cores still face the uncertainty 
of not knowing whether they can deliver the products needed or if they 
can achieve their goals or even survive. 
Criticism 
Thonqjson does not seem to give a clear definition of an organi­
zation to facilitate the reader's understanding of the complex termino­
logy he uses. For example, he does not define the boundaries of the core 
of an organization as differentiated from other organizational elements. 
It is possible he is leaving more precise definitions up to his readers, 
and it is hoped that this paper has been useful in this successive approxi­
mation process. 
l^Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 13. 
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